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Pill Power: The Prequel
* 
 
Goldin and Katz [2002], in an influential paper, argued that giving unmarried minors access to 
the contraceptive Pill was instrumental for women’s professional advancement, because 
such access allowed marriage to be postponed. However, by 1960, married women could get 
the Pill and thence it is not clear why early marriage would interfere with the pursuit of 
professional interests. We explore the effects of this alternative, earlier, and common, route 
to the Pill. Using variation in state minimum-age marriage laws (EMA), we find that EMA 
precipitated marriage, delayed fertility within marriage, and improved the educational and 
occupational outcomes of women, especially non-college women. Thus, fertility control, 
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AEA Annual Meeting. 1 Introduction
The invention of the contraceptive Pill and its FDA approval in 1960 marks
a watershed in social history. The Pill was the rst female controlled, safe,
and cheap, contraceptive. It had the potential to greatly enhance women's
control over fertility and allow for the separation of sexual activity from
the demands of child bearing and rearing { until then the preserve of men.
Arguably, the ensuing sexual revolution was driven by women's, not men's,
greater willingness to engage in non-committal sex. In short, women became
more promiscuous. The world did not fall apart. It was not the same either.
The extent and the mechanics of the role of the Pill in shaping post-
1960s society is a matter of debate. A priori, if women were willing to be
promiscuous, this could have far reaching consequences for gender relations
[Trivers, 1972, Maynard Smith, 1977], including women's presence in the
labor force.
The possibility that the Pill could be behind the marked gains women
have made in the labor market in the last half century remained relatively
unexplored until Akerlof et al. [1996]'s paper pointing to the possibility of
female controlled contraceptives leading to reduced male transfers. Empir-
ically, they linked abortion access to the decline in so called shot-gun mar-
riages, until then the main form of payment for premarital sex, the authors
argued. Faced with this new reality, children on your own, or no children, the
possibility that women might orient themselves more seriously to the labor
market is not far behind.
This proposition was explored by Goldin and Katz [2002] (henceforth GK)
in their inuential paper \The Power of the Pill", where they argued that
2the Pill enabled women to pursue careers previously beyond reach because
the marriage market dictated early marriage and early marriage precluded a
career. The time demands of children { who in the pre-Pill days tended to
follow on the heals of married life { is a candidate reason for the latter.1 Pill
access to unmarried women, they argued, allowed women to delay marriage
without the cost of abstinence or a compromised pool of eligible young men.
The role of Pill access by unmarried minors, henceforth Early Legal Ac-
cess (ELA), has since been explored for a number of outcomes: delayed
fertility [Bailey, 2006, 2009, Guldi, 2008, Bailey, 2010]; women's educational
outcome [Hock, 2007, Ananat and Hungerman, Forthcoming]; men's educa-
tional outcome [Hock, 2007]; and children's outcomes [Ananat and Hunger-
man, Forthcoming, Pantano, 2007].
In this paper, we explore a previously ignored but in no way obscure,
route to the Pill: marriage.2 Through marriage, a minor was considered
emancipated for the purposes of contraceptives. At the time of the Pill's
FDA approval, some two-thirds of states allowed 18-year old women to marry
without parental consent, and early marriage was no rare occurrence. For
most of the 1960s, the median age of rst marriage for women was 20.3
Before the Pill, early marriage may have precluded investments in human
capital, presumably because of the imminent arrival of children. However,
after 1960, married women had access to the Pill and its widely advertised
contraceptive properties [Watkins, 1998]. Moreover, as emphasized by the
1In 1976, Nebraska became the rst US state to recognize rape in marriage.
2The theoretical possibility of which has been noted by, inter alia, Chiappori and
Orece [2008].
3U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports (2000), \Estimated Age at
First Marriage."
3ELA literature, unmarried women were denied the same. Thus, it is at least
a theoretical possibility that marriage served as a conduit to the Pill and that
their combination allowed for the pursuit of professional goals. In addition to
fertility control, marriage could have provided nancial support, particularly
important in a time of relatively limited student aid.
To investigate this hypothesis, we use the fact that states converged on
a minimum-age of marriage of 18 in the 1960s and 1970s, thus providing a
source of state-cohort variation in legal access through marriage. The typi-
cal change was from 21 to 18, and we consider the eect of \Early Marriage
Access" (EMA), as dened by being able to marry without parental consent
before age 21. We combine these law changes with data on women's mari-
tal, educational and occupational and fertility outcomes from the June CPS
covering the period 1977-1995. We focus on women 36-44 years old when
surveyed and born in the period 1935-1959.
We study the eects of EMA laws, along with ELA and abortion laws, all
of which changed around the time the Pill became available. We look sepa-
rately at the eect of these laws on college and non-college women. A reason
for this is that the argument and analysis of GK focused on college women.
There is, however, a priori little reason why Pill access would not extend to
non-college women and, in that spirit, the subsequent literature has included
non-college women as well. But in doing so, it has not distinguished the two
groups, implicitly assuming that the eects documented by GK extend to
non-college women as well. However, as we shall see, the separate analysis
of college and non-college women reveals interesting heterogeneity.
While we conrm GK's ndings of ELA eects for college educated women,
4these eects do not extend to the some 3/4 of women in our sample short of
a four-year college degree.
By contrast, for non-college women, we nd that EMA both precipitated
marriage and signicantly improved their occupational outcomes. By age 22,
EMA increased marriage by 3.7 percentage points, or a 5 percent increase.
By mid-age, EMA had raised the probability of being in a professional or
managerial position by 3.2 percentage points, or a 20 percent increase.
Since we condition our analysis on college graduation status, we also ex-
amine the eects of EMA on educational attainment. We nd that EMA
raised the probability of some college (e.g., an associate degree) by 4.7 per-
centage points, a 11 percent increase, but had no eect on college graduation.
Thus, the found dierences between college and non-college women do not
appear to derive from EMA induced change in selection.
Early marriage may also spell early divorce, and divorce itself can impact
educational and labor market outcomes. First, we consider divorce as an
outcome and nd that EMA does predict early divorce.
Second, to probe whether our education and occupation results are con-
founded, or mediated, by divorce, we pursue two strategies. First, we control
for whether the woman resided in a state with unilateral divorce. Second, we
include information on divorce history available for some CPS years. While
divorce (measured either way) did have an independent eect on educational
and occupational outcomes, our results for EMA were strengthened, which
we interpret as evidence that the found EMA eects are neither confounded
nor driven by divorce.
Tangential to our focus, but of some interest in its own right, we also
5found unilateral divorce to precipitate marriage, conrming the adage that
barriers to exit are barriers to entry (and suggested by Gruber [2004]).
Lastly, we present evidence that EMA extended the gap between marriage
and rst birth, strengthening the case for EMA leading to Pill use. Further-
more, the eect is more pronounced for non-college women, the group for
whom EMA had a greater eect on marriage timing and educational and
occupational outcomes.
In sum, while the previous literature has stressed Pill access to unmar-
ried women and postponement of marriage, we point to marriage itself as an
earlier route to the Pill, and argue that such access was both used and materi-
ally contributed to the educational and occupational upgrading of American
women reaching adulthood in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, our paper strength-
ens the case for the pivotal role of female fertility control, with or without
marriage, for women's labor market outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides a brief background. Section 2.2 discusses the laws. Section 3 presents
our data and results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Background
This section provides a brief background (which can be skipped without loss
of context by those already familiar with the literature).
62.1 Literature Review
Following Goldin and Katz [2002], a number of papers have studied the im-
pact of the Pill on fertility [Bailey, 2006, 2009, Guldi, 2008, Bailey, 2010,
Miller, 2010] (for a dissenting view, see Joyce et al. [2011]), women's empow-
erment [Hock, 2007, Ananat and Hungerman, Forthcoming, Miller, 2010],
and child outcomes [Ananat and Hungerman, Forthcoming, Pantano, 2007].
Most of these papers have focussed on ELA and none has considered Pill
access through marriage.
GK focussed on women with four-year college and argued that ELA
greatly increased women's representation among medical doctors and lawyers,
professions that requires high up-front investments in time consuming and
otherwise demanding training. Empirically they showed that cohort varia-
tion in ELA predicted fraction doctors and lawyers among college graduate
women in the 1970, 1980 and 1990 censuses (ages 30-49 years old, cohorts
1921-1960).
But there is no reason the Pill's eects would be limited to women with a
four-year college degree (henceforth college), or why state variation in access
laws would not be exploited, and subsequent papers have relaxed these re-
strictions, but has typically not separated out college and non-college women.
Bailey [2006] linked variation in ELA to women's greater labor force at-
tachment. The paper claimed that ELA substantially delayed rst birth,
supporting a straightforward link from Pill access to labor force participa-
tion. While the strength of this additional piece of evidence was later found
to be based on coding error (the estimated fertility eect of ELA was ad-
justed down from 9 percent to 1.5 percent [Bailey, 2009, Table II]), the notion
7that the Pill would impact fertility is, however, quite plausible. In a later
paper, Bailey [2010] showed that marital fertility was aected by Pill access,
where the variation in Pill access derived from the so called Comstock laws.
Bailey [2006]'s ndings of delayed but not reduced lifetime fertility and
positive eects on labor force attachment were echoed in Miller [2010]'s study
of the roll-out of family planning services in Colombia. He found contracep-
tive access to have had a limited impact on completed fertility, the main
eect being on timing. Women with family planning access were also found
to have better educational and labor market outcomes.
Hock [2007] used \late adolescent contraceptive consent", similar but not
identical ELA laws as in GK and Bailey [2006], and found that women ages
21 and 22 were more likely to be currently enrolled in college, using the CPS,
October supplement, years 1968-1979. He looked at BA completion using
the 1990 and 2000 censuses, cohorts 1940-1959, and found that \late ado-
lescent contraceptive consent" led to 0.7 percentage point (and statistically
signicant) higher BA completion rate for women. For men, he found no
eect unless lagged, consistent with absence of a direct eect on men (or Pill
access proxying for other time and state varying factors), any eect being
through the partner market.
A few studies have looked at the possibility of Pill access to unmarried mi-
nors aecting child outcomes, and as with abortion access, e.g., Gruber et al.
[1999], the argument hinges on selection eects. Ananat and Hungerman
[Forthcoming] found that in the long term, mothers became more positively
selected, thus improving child outcomes. In the short term, child birth be-
came negatively selected. Their main data set was the 1970/80/90 censuses.
8Pantano [2007] looked at criminality of the cohorts whose mothers had Pill
access as minors, and found negative eects on crime.
Joyce et al. [2011] cast a critical eye on the \ELA-literature." First they
note that the relationship between ELA and teen pill use is weak. In fact,
ELA is only signicant and of the expected sign using the coding of ELA
employed by GK. That is, the ELA coding employed by Bailey [2006], Guldi
[2008], Ananat and Hungerman [Forthcoming] respectively do not replicate
GK's nding, using the same data set: the National Survey of Young Women
1971, thus calling into question the existence of a rst stage for their studies.
Second, they argued that Guldi [2008]'s nding that ELA reduced fertility
(among 15-21 year old women) unravels once the eect of Pill access is allowed
to vary by age. In other words, once the comparison is done within state,
holding age constant, there is no discernible eect of Pill access. Third, they
showed that the crude coding of abortion access resulting from assuming
that abortion was unavailable to a woman until it was legalized in her state
is incorrect and at the minimum understates the role of abortion for fertility.
While abortion was legalized nationally in 1973, abortion was eectively
available from 1970 for those willing to travel to a state that had legalized
abortion, notably New York.
Our paper also adds to the recent literature that has focussed on the ef-
fect of marriage laws. Blank et al. [2009] (whose coding we use), argued that
for marriage age, survey data may be more accurate than administrative
data because of slippage in adherence resulting from jurisdiction shopping
(residents of state X getting married in state Y) or lax enforcement. Two
papers have used stringency (e.g., blood test, proof of age) in requirements
9to look at eects of making the marriage procedure more or less costly. Per-
haps unsurprisingly, more obstacles reduce marriage rates among the young.
Whereas both papers found low socio-economic groups to be more aected,
depending on the period studied, the incidental eects varied. Buckles et al.
[Forthcoming], looked at state repeals of blood test requirements in the pe-
riod 1980 to 2005 and found that such requirements reduced the number of
marriages and increased the out-of-wedlock fertility rate among rst time
mothers. Bharadwaj [2009] looked at the opposite experiment, more strin-
gent requirements in Mississippi enacted in 1960. Higher cost of marriage led
to a decline in marriage rates among 19-23 year old women. Interestingly,
lower marriage rates were also accompanied by a decline in fertility and a rise
in educational attainments, perhaps symptomatic of the pre-ELA era when
love and marriage supposedly went together.
2.2 State Laws
During the 1960's and 1970's many states enacted laws empowering young
adults with respect to several rights. The legal changes were largely moti-
vated \by the enhanced awareness, due in part by the Vietnam War, that
young people had earned greater rights" GK (page 764). The 26th Amend-
ment in 1971 lowered the voting age to 18. In its wake, many states extended
additional rights to young adults by, for instance, lowering the age of ma-
jority, recognizing the mature minor doctrines allowing minors to consent to
medical treatment, and creating family planning statutes allowing physicians
to treat minors [Bailey, 2006].
The trend towards giving young adults more extensive rights also ex-
10tended to marriage. Marriage emancipated a women with respect to several
rights, including the right to consent to medical treatment [DHEW, 1974].
At the time of the Pill's FDA approval in 1960, a majority of states allowed
18-year old women to marry without parental consent. By 1975, all but three
states had lowered the minimum marriage age for women (without parental
consent) to 18 [Blank et al., 2009].
Thus, marriage constituted a route to Pill access for women younger
than 21 years before the mature minor doctrine and family planning statutes
paved the way for contraceptive access for unmarried minors. Or at least to
the extent allowed by the so called \Comstock Laws," laws prohibiting the
sales and distribution of obscenity material [Bailey, 2010]. These obstacles
were removed with the 1965 landmark decision of Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), whereby married couples' right to privacy was armed.
Unmarried women's right to Pill use was armed in the 1972 Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), Supreme Court decision (based on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
3 Data and Results
Our main data set uses the Marriage and Fertility Supplement of the Current
Population Survey (CPS) administered in the month June of selected years.
Information on dates (month and year) of rst marriage and rst birth is
consistently available for all females of childbearing age (18-44) for the years
1977, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1992 and
1995, which we will short hand as June CPS 1977-1995. We restrict the sam-
11ple to women age 36-44, born between 1935 and 1959. The cohort restriction
means that we are looking at women who turned 20 between 1955 and 1979,
a period in which Pill access went from nil to universal, and for which the ac-
cess laws (marriage, Pill, unilateral divorce) explored in this paper converged.
More information on data and variables are in the Appendix.
We estimate a model of the form:
Yisc = MMARisc+EELAisc+AAisc++s+c+sc+Xisc+isc (1)
Yisc 1 if outcome is 1 for individual i, of cohort c, in state s.
MARisc 1 if i could marry before age 21.
ELAisc 1 if i had Pill access before age 21.
Aisc 1 if i had Abortion access before age 21.
s;c state and cohort xed eects.
s  c state specic cohort trend.
Xisc race indicators (Black, other non-White).
All regressions use the June CPS survey weights and have standard errors
clustered at the state level.
We dene ELA and EMA as the right to obtain the Pill, or to marry,
without parental consent before the age of 21, respectively. Those variables
exhibit state by cohort variation, and the coecients on them in equation
(1) are identied by states and cohorts that experienced a law change. Table
1 describes the changes in the minimum marriage age (from Blank et al.
[2009]) dened as the minimum age a women could marry without parental
12consent4. The ELA coding is from Bailey [2006, table 1], and corresponds to
the minimum age an unmarried women could have access to the Pill through
age of majority laws, family planning statutes or mature minor doctrines.
Minimum age restrictions were not absolute barriers to Pill access. Un-
married minors could pretend to be engaged or could convince physicians
they had irregular periods [Goldin and Katz, 2002]. And many minors could
bypass marriage laws by either misreporting their age, or by getting married
in a state with a lower age requirement, without rendering their marriage in-
valid [Blank et al., 2009]. However, such slippage would work against nding
eects of ELA and EMA.
Following the literature, we also control for abortion access. Access is
assumed for all cohorts reaching age 20 after the Row v. Wade 1973 decision,
and for cohorts reaching age 20 after 1970 in Alaska, California, Hawaii, New
York or Washington [Levine et al., 1996].
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the various rights for women younger
than 21.
4The xed eect strategy explores mostly changes of minimum marriage age from 21
to 18 (the two exceptions are Nebraska, with a 21 to 20 change, and West Virginia, with
a 21 to 16 change). The few other laws changes in Table 1 not explored in our xed eect
strategy either include cases of changes that are subsequently reversed over a short period
of time (Georgia in 1965 and 1972, Montana in 1971 and 1973, Iowa in 1972 and 1973,
and Alaska 1974 and 1975) or law changes that always encompass the 18 (South Carolina
in 1957 and Mississippi in 1958), the 19 (Wyoming in 1975) or the 20 (Hawaii in 1969 and
Nebraska in 1972) marriage age. Sensitivity analysis to these other laws changes { such
as re-dening EMA as the right to marry before ages 20 and 19, for example { rendered
the results largely unchanged.
133.1 Marriage
We start by investigating whether allowing women to marry before age 21
induced women to marry earlier by estimating Equation 1 for the event that
a woman was married by a specic age.
The typical change was a lowering of the minimum age from 21 to 18, but
there are reasons to look outside this age window. As mentioned, we use the
minimum age of marriage without parental consent, and most states allowed
for earlier marriage in case parents also consented. Thus, the lowering of the
minimum age from, 21 to 18 could have had an eect on the marriage age
of those younger than 18 since the fact that a 17 year old would be only a
year away from marrying anyway may have inuenced parents' willingness to
consent. Moreover, marriage among those younger 21 may have precipitated
marriages among those older than 21.
Therefore, the outcomes we consider are whether married by age 18,
19,...,25. That is, Yisc in Equation 1 is modied to read Y (x)isc;x 2 f18;:::25g.
Table 2 present the results. Panel A. presents results for all women, and
we see that EMA is associated with a 3.6 percentage point, or 10%, higher
probability of being married by age 20. ELA, in contrast, is associated with
a reduction in the probability of being married, signicant for ages 19, 22
and 23. Breaking the sample into college and non-college women reveals
interesting heterogeneity: the precipitating eect of EMA is driven by non-
college women (Panel B.), EMA raises the probability of being married by
ages 20 through 25, and the eect size ranges from 2 to 4.6 percentage points,
which corresponds to a 10% rise in the probability of being married by age
20. For this sub-sample, there is no discernible eect of ELA.
14For college women (Panel C), EMA has a much more limited eect, only
signicant by age 20. By contrast, ELA is associated with a substantial
reduction in the probability of being married by ages 22 and 23, 4.4 and
4.8 percentage points respectively, or some 10-15% (consistent with GK's
ndings using the 1980 Census).
Recall that the eect of EMA is identied o states that changed the
consent requirements for a 20 year old in the period 1955-1979. Nine states
began to allow women younger than 21 to marry in this period, and the
changes took place after 1960 (Table 1), that is, after the Pill had gained
FDA approval. Clearly, minimum age laws may have been binding for other
reasons than Pill access, but Pill access is a candidate reason for our nding
of precipitated marriage.
We also estimate the probability that a woman was ever married. Since
the age of women at the time of the CPS ranges from 36 to 44, we also
include a vector of age dummies. The results are in column 9. Neither EMA
nor ELA has any eect on whether ever married. This nding is consistent
with EMA and ELA changing the timing but not the eventual probability
of marriage. About 90 percent of women in the sample are ever married.
Going forward, we focus our analysis on them, restricting our sample to ever
married women.
3.2 Educational and Professional Outcomes
Ultimately, we are interested in the role of the Pill for women's labor market
advancements, and we now turn to the question whether early access laws
aected women's educational and occupational outcomes by mid-age (ages
1536-44). Since the outcome may depend on the age of the respondent, we
augment Equation 1 to include a vector of age dummies.
We start with educational outcomes. In addition to being an important
indicator of potential earnings, educational outcomes are also of interest be-
cause of the divide we have found between college and non-college women.
We estimate Equation 1 where the dependent variable is whether a woman
(at the time of the survey) had completed high school or more, some college
or more, or four-year college or more. The results are in Table 3. There
is a statistically signicant eect of EMA on the probability that a woman
had some college or more. The eect is, however, conned to some college,
since neither high school or more, nor four-year college or more, margins
were aected. Thus, while EMA resulted in educational upgrading among
non-college women, there appears to have been no eect on the college/non-
college margin. ELA has no eect.
Next we turn to occupational outcomes. Following GK, we are particu-
larly interested in occupations that indicate attachment to the labor force.
In addition to the categories studied by GK { professional occupations, ex-
cluding teachers and nurses (High Professionals) and doctors/lawyers { we
also look at women in managerial positions and women in all professional
occupations (as dened by the CPS, see Data Appendix). This expansion is
particularly relevant for women with only some college. While not as selective
as doctors and lawyers (0.5 percent of women reporting an occupation), these
other occupations are still selective. Among women reporting an occupation,
only 11 percent were in a managerial occupation, and 18 percent were in a
professional occupation. An important dierence between managerial and
16professional occupations is that the latter tends to require specic training,
whereas managerial positions are more task dened. For instance, funeral
director is a managerial occupation while nurse is a professional occupation.
Table 4 reports results from estimating Equation 1 for the probability
that a woman reports her occupation to be one of the following: manager
or professional, manager, professional, high professional, doctor/lawyer, as
well as whether reporting an occupation at all (i.e., she is in the labor force).
Panel A. reports the results for all women, and panels B. and C. report non-
college and college women separately. For all women, we see that EMA raises
the probability that a woman is in a professional or managerial occupation
(columns 1, 2 and 4), and both EMA and ELA raise the probability of her
being a doctor or lawyer (column 5). Again, looking separately at non-college
and college women reveals interesting dierences.
For non-college women, there is a strong eect of EMA on probability of
being in a managerial and professional occupation, some 3 percentage points,
or a 20 percent increase (column 1), and on being in a high professional
occupation, a 1.5 percentage point eect, or and increase of almost 60 percent
(column 4). By contrast, there is no eect of ELA.
By contrast, for college women, we replicate GK's ndings of ELA raising
the proportion doctors and lawyers (our specication exploits cohort-state
variation, not just cohort variation, and includes state specic cohort trends).
For this sample, we nd no EMA eects.
Finally, the early access laws have no eect on probability of reporting
an occupation (column 6). In other words, these laws cannot explain the rise
in female labor force participation seen in the study period.
173.3 Mediating Mechanisms
If early access through marriage leads to better occupational outcomes, espe-
cially for non-college women, we may ask what mechanisms may have been
involved. Traditionally, marriage has led to a specialization away from mar-
ket work for women. Of course, with the Pill, this relationship might have
been upended or at least modied, since children are no longer a foregone
conclusion. Before turning to fertility timing, we start by looking at divorce.
If non-college women married earlier, their marriages may also have been
less stable, which may prompt women to focus on the labor market, either
in anticipation of, or following, divorce, e.g. Johnson and Skinner [1986].
3.3.1 Divorce
A number of states adopted unilateral divorce in the 1970s and 1980s, a fac-
tor that may both have made divorce and marriage easier (see e.g., Gruber
[2004]). Therefore, it is of interest to consider divorce access, both as an ex-
planatory variable of some independent interest and as a robustness check on
our EMA results (e.g., states that introduced EMA may also have been early
unilateral states, and unilateral divorce is widely believed to have discouraged
traditional division of labor in the family, with concomitant implications for
women's labor supply, e.g., Stevenson [2007]).
We make use of the fact that for 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995, the June
CPS includes information on termination date of the rst marriage (not
just current marital status) to look at whether early access relates to the
probability of divorce. Termination can be because of divorce, widowhood
or separation, but for the ages considered, widowhood is an unusual event,
18and the category is dominated by divorce and separation. For brevity, we
will refer to termination for any reason as \divorce."
Table 5 presents the results from estimating Equation 1 augmented with
an indicator variable for whether the individual had unilateral divorce access
in the year prior to the event in question, following Gruber [2004, table
1]. The events are: married by 22, ever divorced, had divorced by age 25,
30 and 35 respectively. For example, for marriage by 22, we use unilateral
access by 21. When considering ever divorced, we include age dummies in
the regression and dene unilateral access as pertaining to the year prior to
the survey. Except for the rst outcome (columns 1 and 2), we condition on
ever married. For comparison, column 1 presents results from estimating the
probability of marriage before age 22 (which does not require information on
divorce date) on our June CPS 1977-1995 baseline sample.
Interestingly, unilateral access raises the probability of having married
before age 22 in both CPS samples (columns 1 and 2) and the eect is con-
centrated among non-college women (Panel B.). In the limited CPS sample
(Panel B., column 2), the eect size is 4.2 percentage points, or a 7% increase.
The EMA eect is, however, strengthened by this inclusion. For the base-
line sample (Panel B., column 1), EMA is associated with a 4.5 percentage
point increase in the probability of having married by 22 (or a 20% stronger
eect than in the specication excluding unilateral divorce access, cf. Table
2, column 5).
For non-college women, EMA not only raises the probability of early
marriage, but also of early divorce. For instance, EMA almost doubles the
probability of having divorced by 30 (Panel B., column 5). While unilateral
19divorce is strongly associated with rst marriage ending in divorce, unilateral
divorce does not predict divorce by any of the ages considered (25, 30, and
35).
Among college women (Panel C.), unilateral divorce access more than
doubles the probability of being ever divorced, but there is also no eect on
divorce (or marriage) at the specied ages.
Consistent with the notion that early marriage raise divorce risk, ELA is
found to reduce divorce risk by age 30 (college women) and 35 (non-college
women).
In sum, EMA raised probability of early marriage and divorce among
non-college women. Could it be the case that the positive eects of EMA
on educational and occupational outcomes among this group was driven by
divorce rather than marriage (with Pill access)? To investigate this ques-
tion, we re-estimate the education and occupational outcomes regressions
including an indicator variable for unilateral divorce access.
Table 6 presents results for education for all women. Panel A. shows
results when access to unilateral divorce (before age 21) is added to the
regression and we see that our previous ndings are robust to this inclusion,
although the point estimate (and signicance) of the eect of EMA on some
college or more (column 2) is reduced to 3.6 percentage points from 4.7
percentage points. In the next panel, we make use of the limited CPS sample
with marital history information and instead of using unilateral divorce law,
we check if our EMA results are robust to the inclusion of indicator variables
for rst marriage ending in divorce. While this control is highly signicant,
the results for EMA in this limited sample are actually strengthened (Panel
20C.). For instance, the eect of EMA on some college is now 6.7 percentage
points, or a 14% increase from mean rate (column 2).
Turning to the occupational outcomes, Tables 7, we see that results are
virtually unchanged by the inclusion of an indicator variable for unilateral
divorce access (by age 21), with the exception that the eect of ELA on
the probability of being a doctor or lawyer loses signicance at conventional
levels (Panel C, column 6).
As an additional robustness check, we next include an indicator variable
for whether the rst marriage ended in divorce, Table 8. Our previous results
are now strengthened: EMA promotes the occupational outcomes of non-
college women, and we nd no eect of ELA.
We also note that divorce is a strong predictor of labor force participation
(reporting an occupation), and the eect on the fraction women reporting
a managerial occupation is positive but that on a professional occupation is
negative. One interpretation is that on divorce, women who had not planned
to, joined the labor force. If these women nd it dicult to go back to
school (e.g., because of age or nancial constraints), their entry into the
workforce reduces the fraction working women in professional occupations
(which require specic training). However, lack of professional training may
not preclude advancement to managerial positions, and the experience of
divorce may direct women towards the labor market.
The eect of divorce on labor force participation is much stronger among
college than non-college women. First marriage ending in divorce leads to a
7.8 percent increase in probability of reporting an occupation for non-college
women, and a 12.1 percent increase among college women. A larger eect
21on labor force participation among college women is consistent with labor
supply of skilled women having increased disproportionately in the 1970s
and 1980s [Juhn and Murphy, 1997], possibly as result of the increase in the
returns to skills [Katz and Murphy, 1992, Juhn et al., 1993].
In sum, while divorce did have strong independent eects on marital
outcomes and labor force participation, divorce does not appear to have
mediated the eects of EMA on educational and occupational outcomes.
Moreover, controlling for divorce renders the eect of ELA on probability of
a woman being a doctor or lawyer insignicant.
3.3.2 Fertility
Finally, we revisit the question of eects on fertility of early access laws.
As pointed out by Bailey [2006], lower and delayed fertility strengthens the
argument that the Pill was indeed an important catalyst for the educational
and occupational changes. In view of our nding that EMA improved both
the educational and occupational prole of women, non-college women in
particular, we are interested in whether there were also fertility eects and,
if so, whether they were concentrated among non-college women.
Table 9 reports results from estimating Equation 1 where the outcomes
are: a rst birth within x, x 2 f1;2;3;4;5g, years of marriage, and whether
the woman has had a birth. A reason for our interested in the timing of
rst birth relative to rst marriage is that the married-without-kids window
may be particularly propitious for human capital accumulation. Marriage
can provide nancial support, and absent children, homemaking need not be
time consuming. Again, we restrict the sample to ever married women.
22In Panel A., we present results from the whole sample, college and non-
college women combined. We see evidence of EMA delaying fertility, statis-
tically signicant for births within the rst two years of marriage, consistent
with women marrying and getting the Pill. While the sign of the coecient
on ELA tends to be negative, it is highly insignicant.5
Breaking down the results by non-college and college women, we see that
the coecient on EMA is consistently negative for non-college women and
border-line signicant for a rst birth within two years of marriage (Panel
B, column 2). By contrast, for college women (Panel C.), the coecient on
EMA is positive and far from signicant. ELA has no eect.
4 Discussion
In an inuential paper, Goldin and Katz [2002] (GK), emphasized the role
of unmarried women's access to the contraceptive pill { through so called
Early Legal Access (ELA) { for enabling women to enter high-powered pro-
fessions. However, the majority of young women had \early access" years
before ELA: they could marry. And unless marriage annihilates the benets
of fertility control oered by the Pill, access through marriage could also
have contributed to the educational and professional upgrading of American
women who reached adulthood after the Pill's FDA approval in 1960.
In this paper, we have explored this previously ignored route to Pill access
and presented evidence that such access before age 21 { \Early Marriage
Access" (EMA) { precipitated marriage, especially among women with less
5Since we found ELA to postpone marriage, Table 2, and our birth event is relative to
marriage age, our ndings are consistent with Bailey [2006, 2009].
23than a four-year college degree (some three-quarters of women) and lead to
better educational and professional outcomes among these women. Whereas
we also nd that early marriage predicts early divorce, and divorce can have
an independent eect on women's labor market outcomes, divorce does not
appear to be behind the educational and occupational gains associated with
EMA.
Early marriage has generally not been considered conducive to human
capital investments, as stressed by GK, alone a reason to believe the found
positive eects of EMA are Pill related. Delayed fertility provides additional
evidence. We nd EMA to be associated with a postponement of marital fer-
tility, and the eect is more pronounce among non-college women, the group
which also saw a positive eect of EMA on educational and occupational
outcomes.
Since most of the literature has focussed on access to unmarried women
younger than 21, Early Legal Access (ELA), all our regressions have also
controlled for ELA. With respect to Pill access, ELA substitutes for marriage,
and we conrm previous ndings of ELA delaying marriage (and resulting
in more stable marriages), but having limited impact on educational and
occupational outcomes save doctors and lawyers. However, for this one group,
the eect disappears once controls for divorce are included (unilateral divorce
law or individual marital history); whereas the eects of EMA are robust to
their inclusion.
In sum, our paper has extended the existing literature by considering a
hitherto empirically ignored access route to the Pill open to the majority of
18-year old women already in 1960 { early marriage { and showed evidence
24that such access contribute to the educational and occupational upgrading
of American women, marriage notwithstanding.
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EMA ELA A Unilat Div
% States with Access < 21
Souce: Blank et al. [2009], Bailey [2006], Gruber [2004], Levine et al. [1996].
The graph displays proportion of States with marriage, Pill, abortion and unilateral divorce
access before age 21 by cohort (x-axis).
States are weighted by female population ages 36-44 in the 1980 Census.
30Table 1: Changes in Female Minimum Age of Marriage without Parental
Consent
State Year Age Change
South Carolina 1957 18 4
Mississippi 1958 15 -3
Georgia 1965 19 1
Kentucky 1968 18 -3
Hawaii 1969 18 -2
Nebraska 1969 20 -1
Montana 1971 19 1
Iowa 1972 19 1
Virginia 1972 18 -3
Connecticut 1972 18 -3
Rhode Island 1972 18 -3
Georgia 1972 18 -1
Pennsylvania 1972 18 -3
Louisiana 1972 18 -3
Nebraska 1972 19 -1
West Virginia 1972 16 -5
Iowa 1973 18 -1
Montana 1973 18 -1
Alaska 1974 19 1
Alaska 1975 18 -1
Wyoming 1975 19 1
Florida 1977 18 -3
Source: Blank et al. [2009].
: eg, Kentucky reduced the minimum age from
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 3: Education, Ever Married Women
(1) (2) (3)
(N=88,260)
 High School Graduate  Some College  Four-Year College
EMA 0.011 0.047*** 0.032
(0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
ELA 0.004 -0.005 0.004
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
Mean of Y 0.846 0.438 0.207
Data are June CPS 1977, 79-83, 85-88, 90, 92, 95, ages 36-44, cohorts 1935-1959.
All regressions include cohort and state xed eects, state trends, indicator variables for
race (Black,Other non-White) and an indicator for whether individual had abortion access
before age 21.
All regressions use survey weights and have standard errors clustered at the state level.
All regressions include age dummies.
33Table 4: Occupation, By Education, Ever Married Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Man+Prof Man Prof HiProf DrLwr Occ
Panel A. All Women
EMA 0.036** 0.023* 0.012 0.011** 0.006* 0.009
(0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.005) (0.003) (0.012)
ELA 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.003** -0.003
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008)
N 64401 64401 64401 64401 64401 88260
Mean of Y 0.283 0.107 0.176 0.062 0.005 0.731
Panel B. Less than Four-Year College
EMA 0.032* 0.025 0.007 0.015** n.a. -0.001
(0.019) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.013)
ELA 0.008 0.008 -0.000 0.002 n.a. -0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011)
N 50153 50153 50153 50153 n.a. 70068
Mean of Y 0.161 0.093 0.068 0.026 n.a. 0.717
Panel C. Four-Year College or More
EMA -0.029 0.008 -0.037 -0.029 0.022 0.027
(0.038) (0.021) (0.043) (0.025) (0.016) (0.023)
ELA 0.006 -0.006 0.012 0.006 0.010* 0.001
(0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.006) (0.018)
N 14248 14248 14248 14248 14248 18192
Mean of Y 0.710 0.156 0.553 0.184 0.021 0.787
Data are June CPS 1977, 79-83, 85-88, 90, 92, 95, ages 36-44, cohorts 1935-1959.
All regressions include cohort and state xed eects, state trends, indicator variables for
race (Black, Other non-White) and an indicator for whether individual had abortion access
before age 21.
All regressions use survey weights and have standard errors clustered at the state level.
All regressions include age dummies.
34Table 5: Unilateral Divorce Access and Marital Outcomes, by Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Limited
(1977-95) (1980,85,90,95)
Married by 22 Ever Divorceda;b;c Divorced byb;c:
25 30 35
Panel A. All Women
EMA 0.032 0.058** 0.063* 0.033** 0.081*** 0.078***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.034) (0.016) (0.023) (0.025)
ELA -0.017* -0.021 -0.017 -0.019* -0.027** -0.028**
(0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
unilateral 0.026* 0.039*** 0.167*** -0.002 0.018 -0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.018) (0.024)
N 96011 30268 27435 27435 27435 27435
Mean of Y 0.583 0.546 0.349 0.094 0.185 0.270
Panel B. Less than Four-Year College
EMA 0.045*** 0.067*** 0.087** 0.030 0.089*** 0.097***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.034) (0.023) (0.029) (0.032)
ELA -0.005 -0.004 -0.010 -0.019 -0.018 -0.031*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
unilateral 0.030* 0.042*** 0.109*** -0.001 0.015 -0.022
(0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.025)
N 75447 23097 21143 21143 21143 21143
Mean of Y 0.659 0.627 0.374 0.109 0.205 0.292
Panel C. Four-Year College or More
EMA 0.023 0.024 -0.009 0.031* 0.042 0.017
(0.046) (0.055) (0.059) (0.017) (0.029) (0.043)
ELA -0.044** -0.040* -0.026* -0.010 -0.043** -0.011
(0.018) (0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.022)
unilateral 0.011 0.009 0.354*** 0.006 0.035 0.034
(0.018) (0.030) (0.077) (0.021) (0.031) (0.046)
N 20564 7171 6292 6292 6292 6292
Mean of Y 0.307 0.284 0.266 0.044 0.119 0.195
Column 1 data are June CPS 1977, 79-83, 85-88, 90, 92, 95, ages 36-44, cohorts 1935-1959.
Column 2-6 data are June CPS 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, ages 36-44, cohorts 1935-1959.
All regressions include cohort and state xed eects, state trends, indicator variables for race (Black,
Other non-White) and an indicator for whether individual had abortion access before age 21.
All regressions use survey weights and have standard errors clustered at the state level.
a { This regression include age dummies.
b { Sample restricted to ever married women.
c { Divorced refers to a 1st marriage termination either due to divorce, widowhood or separation.
unilateral indicates exposure to unilateral divorce law the year prior to outcome event.
35Table 6: Education, Unilateral Divorce and Marital History Controls, Ever
Married Women
(1) (2) (3)
 High School  Some College  Four-Year College
Panel A. With Unilateral Divorcea (N=88,260)
EMA 0.011 0.036** 0.029
(0.013) (0.018) (0.020)
ELA 0.004 -0.003 0.005
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
unilateral 0.003 -0.042*** -0.011
(0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
Mean of Y 0.846 0.438 0.207
Panel B. With Marital Status Historyb (N=27,435)
EMA 0.049*** 0.067** 0.006
(0.017) (0.030) (0.032)
ELA 0.006 0.004 0.016
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
divorced -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.084***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007)
Mean of Y 0.868 0.478 0.230
a { Baseline Sample: June CPS 1977, 79-83, 85-88, 90, 92, 95, ages 36-44, cohorts 1935-1959.
b { Limited Sample: June CPS 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, ages 36-44, cohorts 1936-1959.
All regressions include cohort and state xed eects, state trends, indicator variables for
race (Black,Other non-White) and an indicator for whether individual had abortion access
before age 21.
All regressions use survey weights and have standard errors clustered at the state level.
All regressions include age dummies.
unilateral indicates whether individual had unilateral divorce access before age 21.
divorced refers to a 1st marriage termination either due to divorce, widowhood or separation.
36Table 7: Occupation, with Unilateral Divorce Control, By Education, Ever
Married Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Man+Prof Man Prof HiProf DrLwr Occ
Panel A. All Women
EMA 0.033** 0.022* 0.012 0.011** 0.008** 0.008
(0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013)
ELA 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.003** -0.003
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008)
unilateral -0.009 -0.006 -0.003 -0.000 0.007*** -0.003
(0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008)
N 64401 64401 64401 64401 64401 88260
Mean of Y 0.283 0.107 0.176 0.062 0.005 0.731
Panel B. Less Than Four-Year College
EMA 0.031* 0.025 0.006 0.015** n.a. -0.000
(0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013)
ELA 0.008 0.008 -0.000 0.002 n.a. -0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011)
unilateral -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 n.a. 0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)
N 50153 50153 50153 50153 n.a. 70068
Mean of Y 0.161 0.093 0.068 0.026 n.a. 0.717
Panel C. Four-Year College or More
EMA -0.030 0.006 -0.035 -0.027 0.027 0.022
(0.037) (0.021) (0.043) (0.026) (0.017) (0.024)
ELA 0.006 -0.006 0.012 0.006 0.010 0.001
(0.020) (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.006) (0.018)
unilateral -0.003 -0.011 0.009 0.008 0.020** -0.022
(0.025) (0.015) (0.024) (0.023) (0.008) (0.021)
N 14248 14248 14248 14248 14248 18192
Mean of Y 0.710 0.156 0.553 0.184 0.021 0.787
Data are June CPS 1977, 79-83, 85-88, 90, 92, 95, ages 36-44, cohorts 1935-1959.
All regressions include cohort and state xed eects, state trends, indicator variables for
race (Black,Other non-White) and an indicator for whether individual had abortion access
before age 21.
All regressions use survey weights and have standard errors clustered at the state level.
All regressions include age dummies.
unilateral indicates whether individual had unilateral divorce access before age 21.
37Table 8: Occupation, with Divorced, Separated, Widow Control, By Educa-
tion, Ever Married Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Man+Prof Man Prof HiProf DrLwr Occ
Panel A. All Women
EMA 0.040 0.034* 0.006 0.013 0.006 -0.007
(0.033) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011) (0.006) (0.020)
ELA 0.011 -0.004 0.015 -0.007 0.002 0.007
(0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.002) (0.018)
divorced -0.042*** 0.021*** -0.063*** -0.009 -0.003** 0.080***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007)
N 20411 20411 20411 20411 20411 27435
Mean of Y 0.308 0.118 0.190 0.068 0.007 0.747
Panel B. Less Than Four-Year College
EMA 0.069** 0.041* 0.028** 0.019* n.a. -0.005
(0.030) (0.023) (0.012) (0.010) (0.023)
ELA -0.013 -0.004 -0.009 -0.005 n.a. -0.009
(0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.022)
divorced 0.007 0.016** -0.009 0.002 n.a. 0.078***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
N 15395 15395 15395 15395 n.a. 21143
Mean of Y 0.175 0.102 0.073 0.029 n.a. 0.731
Panel C. Four-Year College or More
EMA -0.020 0.015 -0.035 -0.001 0.019 -0.016
(0.055) (0.022) (0.049) (0.032) (0.033) (0.051)
ELA 0.020 -0.014 0.034 -0.020 0.003 0.036
(0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.025) (0.009) (0.027)
divorced -0.017 0.060*** -0.077*** 0.014 -0.002 0.121***
(0.020) (0.015) (0.024) (0.017) (0.005) (0.012)
N 5016 5016 5016 5016 5016 6292
Mean of Y 0.714 0.167 0.547 0.185 0.028 0.800
Data are June CPS 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, ages 36-44, cohorts 1936-1959.
All regressions include cohort and state xed eects, state trends, indicator variables for
race (Black,Other non-White) and an indicator for whether individual had abortion access
before age 21.
All regressions use survey weights and have standard errors clustered at the state level.
All regressions include age dummies.
divorced refers to a 1st marriage termination either due to divorce, widowhood or separation.
38Table 9: Fertility, Ever Married Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Birth withina x Years of First Marriage:
x = One Two Three Four Five A Birth
Panel A. All Women (N=88,260)
EMA -0.024* -0.032* -0.017 -0.013 -0.004 0.007
(0.013) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.014)
ELA -0.007 -0.008 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Mean of Y 0.329 0.558 0.676 0.746 0.792 0.900
Panel B. Less Than Four-Year College (N=70,068)
EMA -0.024 -0.036 -0.015 -0.017 -0.005 0.008
(0.018) (0.024) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013)
ELA -0.006 -0.009 -0.000 0.001 -0.005 -0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Mean of Y 0.374 0.618 0.731 0.792 0.830 0.918
Panel C. Four-Year College or More (N=18,192)
EMA 0.001 0.015 0.006 0.016 0.018 0.003
(0.028) (0.030) (0.026) (0.038) (0.044) (0.025)
ELA -0.005 0.001 0.013 -0.006 -0.019 -0.006
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
N 18192 18192 18192 18192 18192 18192
R2 0.044 0.066 0.066 0.060 0.049 0.023
Mean of Y 0.160 0.331 0.466 0.570 0.647 0.829
Data are June CPS 1977, 79-83, 85-88, 90, 92, 95, ages 36-44, cohorts 1935-1959.
All regressions include cohort and state xed eects, state trends, indicator variables for
race (Black,Other non-White) and an indicator for whether individual had
abortion access before age 21.
All regressions use survey weights and have standard errors clustered at the state level.
All regressions include age dummies.
a { Including premarital births. However, this inclusion does not change results.
39Data Appendix: Marriage and Fertility
Supplement of the June Current Population
Survey
A.1 Sample Delimitation
The Marriage and Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey
(CPS) is administered in the month June of selected years. Although the
questionnaire and interview universe vary by survey year, information on
dates (month and year) of rst marriage and rst birth is consistently avail-
able for all females of childbearing age (18-44) for 1977, 1979, 1980, 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1992 and 1995.6 We use the data
retrospectively and restrict the sample to women ages 36-44 from cohorts
1935-1959. The age range guarantees that we use the latest information
or the nal outcome available for those women, such as educational attain-
ment, occupational outcomes and fertility. The cohort restriction means we
are looking at women who turned 20 between 1955 and 1979, a period in
which Pill access went from nil to universal, and for which the access laws
(marriage, Pill, unilateral divorce) explored in this paper converged.
Qualiers for the Marriage and Fertility Supplement questionnaire are
6Dates on rst marriage are available for all females ever married, and the cap on age
44 is imposed in years 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1992. Dates on rst marriage are also available
in years 1984 and 1994, but since the date of rst birth are not asked by then, we disregard
those years in our sample. While the codebook of data in 1986, 1987 and 1988 describes
the fertility information to be available only for ever married women, the actual facsimile
of the questionnaire does not restrict this question to ever married women, and in fact,
data do display date on rst birth for all women. We did not nd any clarication in the
documentation for this pattern, but we veried the response was equally likely for never
and ever married women, and allocation ags did not indicate imputed values for never
married women. Thus, we considered those data entries as valid. The cap on age 44 for
fertility information is again present in years 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1992.
40gender, age and marital status. We drop the observations with imputed
values for those variables. We also drop the observations for which dates of
rst marriage and rst birth were imputed.
Information on date of divorce (of rst marriage) is available only for the
years 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995. When looking at divorce as an outcome or
using it as a control, our sample is restricted to those four years.
A.2 Variables
State Identiers. The June CPS has information on state of residence only,
and we use that to assign the relevant state laws on marriage, Pill and
Abortion access, and Unilateral Divorce.
Cohort Cohorts are dened by year of birth.
Age at First Marriage We generate age at rst marriage by combining
dates (month and year) of birth and rst marriage.
Education We focus on the following three groups:
High School Graduate or more 4 years of completed high school,
or more.
Some College or more 1 year of college, or more.
College Graduate or more 4 years of completed college studies, or
more.
In surveys year 1977 to 1990, education is reported as the highest grade
attended, where the categories are: 1-8 years of elementary school, 1-4
41years of high school, 1-6+ years of college. We combine this variable
with information on whether the highest grade attended was completed
or not.
For 1992 and 1995, education is reported in terms of attainment. High
school graduates include those with diploma, GED or equivalent. For
college, the categories are: (a) some college but no degree, (b) As-
sociate Degree in college/vocational program, (c) Associate Degree in
college academic program, (d) Bachelor's Degree, (e) Master's Degree,
(f) Professional School Degree, (g) Doctorate Degree. We classify (a)
through (g) as Some College or more; and (d) through (g) as College
Graduate or more.
Occupation The June CPS uses the Census Classication of Occupations of
1970 until 1982, and then the Census Classication of 1980. We focus
on managerial and professional occupations.7 We further look into
increasingly selective subgroups of the professional occupation: \high
professional occupations" and doctors or lawyers.
Man Managerial Occupations.
Prof Professional Occupations.
Man+Prof Managerial and professional occupations.
HiProf Professional Occupations excluding teachers and nurses.
DrLwr Doctors or Lawyers.
7Among the following groups: managerial and professional specialty occupations; farm-
ing, forestry, and shing occupations; experienced unemployed not classied by occupa-
tions technical, sales, and administrative support occupations; precision production, craft,
and repair occupations; service occupations; and operators, fabricators, and laborers.
42For 1977 to 1982. \Man" are those classied as Managers and Admin-
istrators, except Farm (codes 200-245). The Managerial Occupations
include executive, administrative and managerial occupations as chief
executives, nancial managers, public administrators, personnel and
purchasing managers, among the many other management related oc-
cupations. \Prof" are those classied as Professional, Technical and
Kindred Workers (codes 0-200). We exclude codes 80-85 and 163-173,
who are technicians not included in professional occupations from 1983
and onwards. The Professional Occupations include engineers, doctors,
mathematicians, natural scientists, social scientist, lawyers, judges, and
teachers, among others. \HiProf" excludes primary and secondary
teachers (codes 141-145) and and health assessment and treating occu-
pations (registered nurses, dietitians, pharmacists and therapists, codes
64 and 74-76). \DrLwr" are physicians, dentists, veterinarians, lawyers
and judges (codes 30-31, 62, 65, and 74).
For 1983 to 1995. The occupational groups are dened as above, but
the codes vary. \Man" corresponds to codes 0-42. \Prof" corresponds
to codes 43-199. \HiProf" excludes codes 155-162 95-106 from the
\Prof" category. \DrLwr" are codes 84-86 and 178-179.
Birth Timing We generate timing of rst birth relative to rst marriage
using dates (month and year) of rst marriage and rst birth.
First Marriage Ended Dates on rst marriage termination are reported
in two variables: date the rst marriage ended for marriages ending
in divorce or widowhood, and date the respondent stopped living with
43spouse for marriages ending in divorce or separation. In order to max-
imize data availability on marriage terminations we consider rst the
date a marriage ends, and when missing, consider the date the re-
spondent stopped living with spouse. For brevity, we refer to these
terminations as divorce.
First Marriage Ended before Age x To generate age at divorce (widow-
hood or separation) of rst marriage, we combine information on date
of rst marriage termination and date of birth.
Race Controls We use three race categories: \white", \negro/black" and
\other" { the race categories until 1988. Starting in 1990, \American
Indian, Aleut, Eskimo" and \Asian or Pacic Islander" can also be
specied. We code those two new options under \other."
44